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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4286 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
RAYVAUGHAN WHITE,  
                               Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cr-00093-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 21, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:   November 24, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Rayvaughan White was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for violating the 
counterfeit currency laws.  He appeals, arguing that the District Court failed to 
                                              
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
meaningfully consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)1 and should have imposed a below-
Guideline sentence.  For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm. 
I 
 Police arrested White and co-defendants Kyle Gumbs and Malik Burton at a mall 
in Bensalem, Pennsylvania, on suspicion of having passed counterfeit $100 notes at 
various stores.  PSR ¶¶ 6-8.  Upon arrest, officers seized fourteen, twenty-six, and six 
$100 counterfeit notes from White, Gumbs, and Burton, respectively.  PSR ¶¶ 7-8.  
Burton explained to police that he, Gumbs, and White each knew that the money was 
counterfeit and that they had left New York earlier that day, in a car White rented, to 
spend it outside of the area in which they all lived.  PSR ¶ 9.    
 Each defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to pass and passing counterfeit 
currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 472.  See App. 1, 42, 48.  The District 
Court sentenced Gumbs to four months’ imprisonment, see App. 42-43, Burton to six 
months’ imprisonment, see App. 48-49, and White to eight months’ imprisonment.2   See 
App. 1-2.    
 During White’s sentencing, the District Court adopted the Probation Office’s 
recommendation of a total offense level of eleven, resulting in an advisory Guideline 
                                              
 
1 Section 3553(a)(6) requires sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.” 
 2 The parties agree that the defendants are “identically situated in terms of 
complicity,” see App. 31; Appellant Br. 17, and each began with the same offense level.  
Gumbs and Burton, however, received adjustments under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for 
acceptance of responsibility, see Supp. App. 6, 36, resulting in a total offense level of 
nine and an advisory Guideline range of four to ten months’ imprisonment.  
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range of eight to fourteen months.  See App. 31-40.  The District Court rejected White’s 
request for a downward variance and declined to subtract two points from White’s total 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, citing his failure to 
comply with the conditions of pretrial release by testing positive for drugs and failing to 
respond to the Probation Office’s request for an interview.  See App. 32.3  The District 
Court further explained: 
[W]hat you did, even though you might think it was a minor crime 
and it wasn’t a lot of money, is a very serious criminal offense.  And I 
think one of the reasons we have very little counterfeiting, is that 
when people are convicted of it, Judges treat it seriously.  And 
because of that fact, and because you didn’t cooperate with Pretrial 
requirements of submitting to a Probation Office [sic], I’m going to 
give you a custodial sentence.  I think it should be a [G]uideline 
sentence. 
 
App. 37.  Continuing, the District Court stated: 
[L]et me be specific in terms of [18 U.S.C. §] 3553.  I think 
counterfeiting requires punishment.  It requires deterrence.  The 
defendant’s conduct while on . . . pretrial release has not been 
satisfactory.  And I think a term of incarceration is necessary for both 
his own rehabilitation and for public safety. 
 
App. 39. 
 White argues on appeal that the District Court failed to meaningfully consider       
§ 3553(a)(6), see Appellant Br. 14-17, and that it should have sentenced him below the 
                                              
 
3 White asserted that he was unable to meet with his Probation Officer because he 
was suffering from stress-related illness and had been hospitalized.  See App. 33-35.  The 
District Court rejected this claim, finding that he had not been ill the entire time after his 
plea and there was sufficient time to have met with Probation.  App. 35. 
4 
 
advisory Guideline range “given the totality of the mitigating factors present in this case.”  
Appellant Br. 15.4  
II 
 Our review of a District Court’s sentencing determination must ensure that “‘a 
substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.’”  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 566 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “The abuse-of-discretion standard applies 
to both our procedural and substantive reasonableness inquiries.”  Id. at 567 (citing Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  “The party challenging the sentence bears the 
burden of proving its unreasonableness.”  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
 White contends that the District Court “did not accurately consider and assess the 
similarity in the crimes committed by [him] and his co-defendants,” as required by          
§ 3553(a)(6), nor explain the discrepancy between their sentences.  See Appellant Br. 14, 
16-20.  Because the District Court is required to show that “the particular circumstances 
of the case have been given meaningful consideration within the parameters of                      
§ 3553(a),” Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196, this argument is construed as a procedural 
challenge. 
 White’s § 3553(a)(6) argument is without merit.  “Congress’s primary goal in 
enacting § 3553(a)(6) was to promote national uniformity in sentencing rather than 
                                              
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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uniformity among co-defendants in the same case.”  United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 
273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  As a result, “a defendant cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek 
a reduced sentence designed to lessen disparity between co-defendants’ sentences.”  Id.  
Because White is attempting to do just that, and because § 3553(a) permits but does not 
require a district court to consider sentencing disparity among co-defendants, id., any 
failure by the District Court to do so would not constitute procedural error.5 
 White also argues that “the totality of the mitigating factors present in this case”—
including the lower sentences of his co-defendants—renders his sentence substantively 
unreasonable.  Appellant Br. 15.  Where, as here, the District Court’s sentencing 
determination is procedurally sound, “we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
                                              
 5 Moreover, the District Court did “meaningfully consider” White’s sentence in 
relation to those of Gumbs and Burton.  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567-68.  At White’s 
sentencing, the Government explained that White “is distinguishable from Gumbs,” who 
had been sentenced the day before, because though both failed drug tests, White also 
failed to meet with the Probation Office, which the Government characterized as the 
“more egregious conduct.”  App. 31-32.  White’s failure to meet with Probation not only 
violated the Court’s requirement but deprived the District Court of information that 
White could have provided.  As a result, the District Court declined to grant him a 
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.  See App. 32, 37, 39.  Thus, 
White was situated differently from Gumbs, who received a downward adjustment and a 
more lenient sentence.  The District Court explicitly articulated this view at Burton’s later 
sentencing hearing: 
Mr. Gumbs . . . had the best pretrial record of the group of you, and he 
got four months.  Mr. White had more severe problems.  He got eight 
months.  So the sentence I’m going to give you is . . . a term of six 
months. 
Supp. App. 15.  In short, “it is perfectly clear that the [District Court] considered the need 
to avoid unwarranted disparities, but also considered the need to avoid unwarranted 
similarities among other [co-defendants] who were not similarly situated.”  Gall, 552 
U.S. at 55 (emphasis in original). 
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the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  The “touchstone” of this inquiry is 
“whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 We find that it does.  At sentencing, the District Court acknowledged White’s 
“mitigating factors,” Appellant Br. 15, including his proffered excuse for violating the 
terms of his pretrial release and his limited criminal history, but it rejected the notion that 
either warranted a downward variance from the advisory Guideline range.  Moreover, the 
District Court explained that its sentence was based in part on White’s failure to meet 
with Probation, which distinguished him from his co-defendants.6  Finally, the District 
Court made clear that its sentence was intended to promote deterrence and reflect the 
seriousness of the crime, which in its view “depriv[es] working people of the ability to 
earn money that has respect and has value.”  App. 36.  Based on the sentence and reasons 
for it, we cannot say that no reasonable court would have imposed the same sentence. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
                                              
 
6 Furthermore, because a criminal defendant “has no constitutional right to be 
given a sentence equal in duration to that of his or her co-defendants . . . [a] disparity of 
sentence between co-defendants does not of itself show an abuse of discretion.”  Parker, 
462 F.3d at 276-277 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
